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AESTHETICS IN AND ABOUT THE LAW
By RICHARD F. WOLFSON '
The subject-matter of philosophy has traditionally been
divided into metaphysics, ethics, logic, and aesthetics.' And
although such a classification may be unsatisfactory in cate-
gorizing the results of philosophical speculation, it neverthe-
le.ss provides a convenient critical tool in judging the purposes
of philosophical literature.
Yet little attempt has been made similarly to classify the
philosophies of particular branches of knowledge, such as the
philosophy of history or of science.2 And in jurisprudence, here
considered the equivalent to philosophy of law, criticism has
generally proceeded according to an historical thesis rather
than according to content broadly considered. 3 It is my belief
that an evaluation of legal philosophy according to content will
demonstrate that although three of the four categories have at
some time been systematically treated, no such effort has been
made in the field of aesthetics.4 The purpose of this paper is
not, however, to develop any specific theory of a jurisprudence
of aesthetics but rather to do the spadework by indicating and
outlining the sources from which such a theory might be de-
rived.
It is first necessary to discuss in some detail the four-fold
categorization of jurisprudence; for arbitrary and unsatisfac-
* LL.B., Yale Law School; Law Clerk, United States Circuit
Court of Appeals.
'For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed that epistemology
may properly be included within "metaphysics."
'Great debate is, of course, possible whether any branch of
knowledge can possess a philosophy of its own. It has been argued
that the phrase "philosophy of history" or "philosophy of law" is a
contradiction in terms.3See, for example, POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON JURIS-
PRUDENCE (5th ed. 1943) 4-39. Cf. Frank, Book Review (1943) 52
YALE L. J. 934, 936: "The reader is tempted, just for fun, to try new
classifications which would, for instance, lump together Aristotle's
great manual on how to win law suits, comprising a considerable part
of his RHETORIC, with Holmes's famous "bad man" thesis, found in
his paper, The Path of the Law, and to collocate parts of Plato's
totalitarian theories, found in his REPUBLIC AND LAWS, with current
Nazi writings on government."
'A single and brilliant exception is Llewellyn, On the Good,
the True, the Beautiful, in Law (1942) 9 U. CH. L. REV. 224, esp. at
227-250.
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tory though it be, it does in a measure demonstrate the lack of
sympathy on the part of legal philosophers with what might be
a large body of theory.
Of the four categories, the one apparently most difficult
to correlate with law is metaphysics. Jurisprudence normally
has not been concerned with the recurring problems of meta-
physicians: free will as against determinism; the choice be-
fween solipsism, empiricism, and other established philosophical
hypotheses. Yet Pound, in his staggering bibliography of juris-
prudence, deems it proper to describe as "metaphysical" a
great deal of nineteenth century jurisprudential literature,
one of the many schools springing from Kant.5 And it is prob-
able that what Pound terms "social-philosophical" could with
equal right also be called metaphysical. 6 But if we accept only
Pound's own choice of terminology, names such as Kant, Sa-
vigny, Fichte, and Hegal are included3
The relationship of law to ethics has been more fully
treated.s Not only can the natural-law schools be included" but,
perhaps, the many other groups which have sought not to
criticize the law by some external standard of morality but
have been intrigued by the correspondence (or lack of cor-
respondence) between the law and the moral standards of the
community.' 0
As to logic, two quite distinct schools of thought are ap-
parent. The first has concerned itself with the creation of a
legal vocabulary which can be employed precisely and mean-
ingfully and which describes legal result.' The second has
sought to orgailize law into a sequential series of legal propo-
sitions, as in the case of Austin.' 2 But it may be objected that
IPound, op. cit. supra note 3, at 65-66, 198-199. Pound also
terms one group as "neo-metaphysical." Id. at 203.
'Under "social-philosophical" Pound includes "neo-Kantian,"
"neo-Hegelian," and "neo-idealist." Pound, op cit. supra note 3, at
199-202.
"See note 5 supra.
s Cf. Pound, op. cit. supra note 3, at 80-83.
See Pound, op. cit. supra note 3, at 8-10.
"'The definition might be so broadened as to include important
parts of both realistic and sociological jurisprudence. Cf. Llewellyn,
On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (1942) 9 U. CHI. L.
REV. 224.
'See Pound, op. cit. supra note 3, at 144-190. Cf. Lasswell &
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy; Professional Training
in the Public Interest (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 203, 267-269.
"See Pound, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12-13, 134-139, 194-195.
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the concern of Austin and others with a symmetrization of
law1" is in truth a theory of aesthetics, since symmetry and
cohesion in doctrine as well as in artistic achievement are ap-
pealing to one's sense of the beautiful. Yet the conscious pur-
pose of the analytical school or of the codifiers was to propose
and enact a system of law which was to be the logical develop-
ment of a major premise they held to be intellectually valid.
They drew no distinction, as do the logical positivists, between
the truth and beauty of pure logic and that truth which comes
from the closest possible approximation to "fact." Certainly,
they would have denied that the intellectual appeal of logical
form or other aesthetic considerations played any part in their
efforts.
1 4
We come now to the fourth category, aesthetics. 15 It is,
of course, conceivable that the nature of law precludes any
aesthetic hypothesis. The initial presumption, however, is that
'See, for example, Wolfson, Legal Doctrine, War Power, and
Japanese Evacuation (1944) 32 Ky. L. J. 328. Contra: Radin, In
Defense of an Unsystematic Science of Law (1942) 51 YALE L. J.
1269. Cf. Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1448.
" See Arnold, Institute Priests and Yale Observers (1936) 84
U. PA. L. REV. 811, 814: "We dramatize the rule of law in our judicial
system and in our constitution. We do not conduct ceremonies as
they do both in England and Japan. Our ceremonies are built on
the pattern of a feast of pure reason. The spectacle of a hundred or
so prominent lawyers and scholars sitting in a great hotel listening to
the Restatement discussed section by section is congenial to our
protestant way of looking at the symbols of government. It was this
love of dialectic and fear of ceremony which made the Restatement
take the form it did. Yet the same distrust of ceremony forced the
members of the American Law Institute to deny that their function
was ceremonial at all."
Contra: Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law
(1942) 9 U. CHi. L. REV. 224. Professor Llewellyn seems to feel that
men such as Langdell and the codifiers had a very explicit aesthetic
goal in mind: "This . . . view of legal esthetics sees law not as a
matter of language in general, but as a matter of rules cast into
language. . . . Structured beauty becomes thus the esthetic goal
-an intellectual architecture, clean, rigorous; above all, carried
through in sharp chiseling to body out the predetermined plan, in
every vault, in each line, into each angle." . Id. at 228.
'SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTY (1896) 2: "That aesthetic
theory has received so little attention from the world is not due to
the unimportance of the subject on which it treats, but rather to
lack of an adequate motive for speculating upon it, and to the small
success of the occasional efforts to deal with it. Absolute curiosity,
and love of comprehension for its own sake, are not passions we have
much leisure to indulge: they require not only freedom from affairs
but, what is more rare, freedom from prepossessions and from the
hatred of all ideas that do not make for the habitual goal of our
thought."
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the aesthetic sense extends to all fields of human endeavor. 10
Yet what little writing there has been on the aesthetic in law
either has not sought to generalize from particular eases or
has been embarassingly naive. 17
Aesthetic theory "may be divided into two groups: that
group of writings in which philosophers have interpreted
aesthetic facts in the light of their metaphysical principles,
and made of their theory of taste a corollary or footnote to
their systems; and that group in which artists and critics
have ventured into philosophical ground, by generalizing
somewhat the maxims of the craft or the comments of the sen-
sitive observer."is Here we discuss only the sources for the
latter type of aesthetic theory. To undertake an investigation of
the possible sources for the former would impose an obligation
to examine the basic premises of all the deductive philosophies
of law which have been evolved, clearly an overwhelming task.
Yet because of the uncertainty as to what type of aesthetic
theory can be developed from "the law," all the possible
sources, divergent in nature though they may be, must be
shown. We must look to all the points where the lines of law
and of art cross. Four such crossings are apparent:
1-Artistic and literary creations which employ illustrations
from the law;
2-Literary creation within the law;
3-Decisions involving aesthetic judgments on the part of triers;
4-The general nature of the legal system.
These areas are chosen on the general assumptions that it is
likely that law, like other arts and sciences, reflects the cultural
temper of the times; that law like art may be approached
aesthetically as well as psychologically and sociologically; and
that before any theory of juristic aesthetics is developed, some
critical vocabulary new to the law must either be originated
or borrowed.
For purposes of the first source, creations using illustra-
tions from the law, plentiful examples can probably be found
not only in the most likely field, that of literature, but also in
Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (1942)
9 U. Cm. L. REV. 224, 227 et seq.
I See, for example, Chandler, The Attitude of the Law Toward
Beauty (1922) 8 A.B.A.J. 470. But see the exception noted in foot-
note 4 supra.
I See Santayana, op. cit. supra note 15.
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painting 19 and drawing,2 sculpture, 2 1 architecture, 2 2 music, 23
and combinations of the arts such as the ballet.2 4 It is, however,
literature which has received the most study. Shakespeare,
25
Dickens, 2 6 Conrad 2 7 and many others have been combed by
lawyers for their use of the law. Yet all these studies have
either sought to determine the legal accuracy of the writer or
have directed "the attention of lawyers to the pleasures . . . of
a class of reading which, while not strictly professional, is di-
verting and entertaining, and which will be indirectly profit-
able to them in their own special field of learning." 2" Because
of this belief that "legal" literature has no importance to the
lawyer other than that of light entertainment, no lists similar to
Wigmore's compilation of a hundred legal novels2 9 have been
"For a painting in the modern idiom, see Lawyer by Tchelit-
chew, reproduced in SOBY, TCHELITcHEW (1942) 52.
7'Many satirical drawings of Daumier are concerned with law-
yers, courtroom scenes, etc.
" Examples are the various interpretations of "Justice."
"
2See, for example, the Sterling Law Building, Yale University,
New Haven, Connecticut. Not only does the incidental decoration
use the law as motif, but the building is said to have been planned
after the English Inns of Court.
'For example, the music in Gilbert and Sullivan's operetta,
Trial by Jury. Also pertinent, perhaps, is the incidental music in
the many movies dealing with legal matters.
"' Two examples are:
Hear Ye! Hear Ye! Book: Ruth Page and Nicholas Remisov.
Music: Aaron Copland. Scenery and Costumes: Nicholas Remisov.
Choreography: Ruth Page. First Produced: Chicago Opera House,
Chicago, Nov. 30, 1934.
Symphonie Fantastique (esp. Part IV). Book: Hector Berlioz.
Music: Hector Berlioz. Scenery and Costumes: Christian Berard.
Choreography: Leonide Massine. First Produced: Royal Opera,
Covent Garden, London, July 24, 1936.
For further reference, see BEAUMONT, COMPLETE BOOK OF BALLETS
(1938) 778-79, 754-57.
-' CLARKSON AND WARREN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN SHAKESPEARE
AND THE ELIZABETHAN DRAMA (1942).
:' HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (1928).
:'Roughead, Conrad on Crime (1928) 40 JuRm. REV. 250.
"Hitcher, The Reading of Lawyers (1928) 33 DICK. L. REV. 1,
12. See Roesch, Is Acquaintance with Legal Novels Essential to a
Lawyer? (1926) 21 ILL. L. REV. 109; Hunt, Law, Lawyers and Litera-
ture (1937) 5 J.B.A. KAN. 234.
2"Wigmore, A List of One Hundred Legal Novels (1922) 17 ILL.
L. REV. 26.
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made of poetry 30 .or of drama. 31  And Wigmore himself,
although writing in 1922, did not include one of the greatest
of such novels, Crime avd Punishment, by Dostoievsky.
3 - Not
only is the chief character of that book a law student, but the
entire book is an intricate and subjective study of the moral
foundations of obedience to the legal system imposed by the
social order. And no recognition is to be found in the law re-
views of the expressionistic novel, The Trial, by Franz Kafka,'
33
which employs the German legal system as its consistent meta-
phor or, at least, as its point of departure. Kafka, it is to be
assumed, chose the law as a metaphor because, being a deliberate
artist, he found in the law some aesthetic effect he wished to
convey to his readers, perhaps in his case a relentless procedure.
A broad study of legal art and literature might well throw
light on the "outsider's" view of law as a pattern, aesthetic or
no, and perhaps on comparative relationships of art to society
and law to society. A second function of such a study would be
to provide law, if found to have any connection whatsoever
with artistry, with a critical terminology. That such a termi-
nology has been absent in the law can be seen in the writing of
lawyers upon the literature of the law, as, for example, Dick-
ens' Bleak House.34 In advising the reading of such and such a
novel, no more accurate or incisive critical language than
"good literature" or "interesting" is to be found.
Nor is more satisfactory criticism to be discovered within
the limits of our second source, that is where lawyers have
looked to their own law-books for literary content.3 5 Holds-
worth, for example, in one article made up what might be con-
sidered an anthology of literature to be found in the cases; yet
he gives no standards, no reasons for his choices.30 Only the
, One professor has been known to include in his examination
on property law a question requiring the students to criticize the
property concepts in the poem, Legal Fiction, by the young English
critic and poet, William Empson. It can be found in NEW POEMS
1943 (edited by Oscar Williams) 87-88. See also "Law, Say the
Gardeners, Is the Sun" in AUDEN, ANOTHER TIME (1940); "The
Habeas Corpus Blues" in AIKEN, BROWNSTONE ECLOGUES (1943).
' See the poetic drama, TRIAL OF A JUDGE (1938) by the English
poet, Stephen Spender. Book Review (1938) 54 ScoT. L. REV. 242.(trans. from the Russian by Constance Garnett, 1916).
(trans. from the German by Willa and Edwin Muir, 1937).
3' (centenary ed., 1911).
' Hamilton, Cardozo the Craftsman (1938) 6 U. CIi. L. REv. 1,
4, n. 7.
Holdsworth, Literature in Law Books (1939) 24 WASH. U.L.Q.
153. But see id. at 171-72 for the reasons why literature is to be
found -in the law at all.
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acute Cardozo, 37 who in a single essay showed his ample literary
background by referring to Henri Beyle, Henry James, and
George Bernard Shaw, among others, created any sort of legal-
literary criticism of the opinions of judges.38
An imaginative investigation into courts' opinions might
have the same purposes as the forementioned study of the way
iii which artists and authors use the law as illustration. Since
the judge is also author and actor, it is likely that, in an aesthe-
tic sense, he reflects in his opinion his views as to the drama, 39
the intensity, the snnmetry,40 the fumction of law, even as the
sculptor memorializes in stone his artistic tastes, aims, and be-
liefs. Once again, any possible correlation between art and law
as a culture product might be further developed. And secondly,
it might provide or at least make more familiar a critical
vocabulary and critical standards.
Insofar as quantity of discussion is concerned, the third
possible source for a theory of legal aesthetics-where, from
the nature of the case, the trier makes a determination of aesthe-
tic value-has been adequately covered. Within this area come
questions of obscenity, copyright, zoning legislation, and so on.
But it must be recognized that it is doubtful whether any com-
plete aesthetic system can be drawn from the cases in these
fields. Judges are obliged to decide only minimums. They can-
" See Hamilton, Cardozo the Craftsman (1938) 6 U. Cni. L. REV.
1, 5, n. 9.
" Law and Literature in CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND
OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES (1931) 3-40. See id. at 4-5:
"But I over-emphasize and exaggerate if I seem to paint the
picture of any active opposition that is more than sporadic and ex-
ceptional to so amiable a weakness as a love of art and letters. A
commoner attitude with lawyers is one, not of active opposition, but
of amused or cynical indifference. We are merely wasting our time,
so many will inform us, if we bother about form when only substance
is important. I suppose this might be true if any one could tell us
where substance ends and form begins. . . . The two are fused
into a unity." Cf. CALAMANDREI, EULOGY OF JUDGES (1942) 78-79,
85-86.
"'Cairn, Plato's Theory of Law (1942) 56 HARV. L. REV. 359, 368:
"Law for Plato is a form of literature, and the legislator's respon-
sibility is greater than the poet's. The legislator is himself the
author of the finest and best tragedy he knows how to make. In
fact, all his polity has been construed as a dramatization of the
fairest and best life, which is in truth the most real of tragedies."
"Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach (1935) 35 COL. L. REV. 809, 845; "We know . . . judges are
craftsmen, with aesthetic ideals, concerned with the aesthetic judg-
ments that the bar and the liw schools will pass upon their awkward
or skillful, harmonious or unharmonius, anomalous or satisfying,
actions and theories; but . . . we have no specific information on
the extent of this aesthetic bias in the various branches of the law."
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not recommend artistic design or improve literary content.41
The issue is ordinarily only one of drawing the line. Moreover,
aesthetic judgments, if made, are likely to remain unexpressed
since, one, they are usually overshadowed by economic and other
social policies and, two, the law has traditionally avoided
deciding cases on aesthetics alone.
Yet despite obstacles, aesthetic judgments are to be
found.42 The extremes can be seen in the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses
43
where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals finally vindicated
the literary critics and permitted the intelligent public to read
what it had been reading anyway. But the dissenting opinion
of Judge Manton, stern and puritanical, explicitly condemned
"art for art's sake" literature and upheld the imposition of
moral* standards from above upon the people. 44 Even more
liberal in some respects was the decision in People v. Gotlani
Book Mart,4 5 which permitted the sale in New York of If It Die
by the French novelist, Andre Gide.4 6 This autobiography, con-
taining for the most part detailed particulars as to the author's
childhood and early adulthood, did, however, also include a
4See Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature (1938)
52 HARV. L. REV. 40, 71: "Not only is the general law of obscenity
absurd as applied to literature, and not only is the task of judging
literature beyond the average judge's capacity and ability, but as a
matter of physical organization courts are not able to do justice to
literature, in the main, even had they such capacity and ability."
Donnelly, The Police Power and Esthetic Zoning (1937) 5 J. B. A.
KAN. 215, 223: "An administrative body composed of experts offers
no panacea for the problem of esthetic zoning. Zoning is a negative
art. It is more conspicuous by its absence than by its presence.
If the architectural design and the general beauty of American
cities is to be greatly improved, it must come from something other
than legal regulations and restrictions. In some instances a degree
of beauty may be a by-product of the law, but its creation must
come out of constructive design ...
"The problem to be faced is that by arbitrary legal restrictions,
there is no stimulation toward the positive creation of beauty. The
best in architecture is discouraged or prohibited. To this extent,
mediocrity is fostered by present-day zoning practice. .... "
"For a thorough and sophisticated exposition of the law of
obscenity, see Alpert, Judicial Censorship of Obscene Literature(1938) 52 HARV. L. REV. 40.
4'72 F. (2d) 705 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934).
"The people need and deserve a moral standard; it should be
a point of honor with men of letters to maintain it." Id. at 711.
4'285 N. Y. Supp. 563, 158 Misc. 240 (Mag. Ct. 1936).4
1 Gide has been one of the authors most preoccupied with legal
problems and one most neglected by* lawyers. Having sat as ajuror in a French court, he wrote RECOLLECTIONS OF THE ASSIZE
COURT (trans. from the French by Philip A. Wilkins, London, 1941).
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lurid confession and defense of Gide's homosexuality. More-
over, Gide was little known to the American public; his follow-
ing. was one of "literati;" he was at the time (and still is) defi-
nitely avant-gardiste in character. Thus, when the court said
that "Andre Gide is considered a great author; he is therefore
entitled to be heard,'' 4 7 it was accepting the opinions of the
most advanced portion of the readers. It was permitting the
sale of a book which could appeal to only a small minority, and
it was trusting the moral discretion and literary judgments of
this group.
Very fully considered has been the question whether courts
should permit the police power in zoning and bill-board legis-
lation to be used for purely aesthetic purposes.4s And it has
been in this field that judges and lawyers have tried to define
and make concrete their definitions and attitudes as to beauty.
On the one hand, an author speaks of "aesthetic security'' 4 9
and a judge believes that "our sensibilities are becoming more
refined;" " on the other hand, we find courts either expressly
or impliedly linking beauty and property values.51
285 N. Y. Supp. 563, 570, 158 Misc. 240, 246 (Mag. Ct. 1936).
' See, for example, Donnelly, The Police Power and Esthetic
Zoning (1937) 5 J.B.A. KAN. 215; Light, Aesthetics in Zoning (1930)
14 MINN. L. REV. 109; Gardener, The Massachusetts Billboard Deci-
sion (1936) 49 HARV. L. REV. 869; Profitt, Public Esthetics and the
Billboard (1931) 16 CORN. L.Q. 151; Note (1935) 2 U. Cm. L. REV.
638; Note (1937) 44 W. VA. L.Q. 58.
"Terry, The Constitutionality of Advertising Signs on Property
(1914) 24 YALE L. J. 1, 9.
" State ex rel Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N. W.
451, 455 (1923). See also Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances
(1939) 25 CAN. L.Q. 17: "Unquestionably, the aesthetic sensibilities
of the public generally are increasing. .... "
' General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Department of Public Works,
289 Mass. 149, 173, 193 N.E. 799, 811 (1935): "Because of the serious
aversion to such signs and billboards, they substantially and materi-
ally annoy and disturb the occupants and interfere with the com-
fortable enjoyment of their homes. The introduction of signs and
billboards into such a neighborhood tends seriously to injure and
depreciate the value of the property." But note id. at 201, 193 N.E.
823, that where the court had under consideration signs near the
State House at Boston it relied almost entirely on aesthetic grounds:
"The State House by its commanding position, its distinguished
architecture, and above all by its civic importance as the home of
the executive and legislative departments of government, is entitled
to surroundings not detracting from its dignity. . . . We think
that refusal on grounds of fitness and taste to renew the permit to
the plaintiff . . . was within the scope of the authority con-
ferred. . . ." Cf. State v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 284, 97
So. 440, 444 (1923): "The beauty of a fashionable residence neigh-
a
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But rare are the cases which sustain in fact zoning regula-
tion for aesthetic reasons alone. 52  The usual view is that
". .. for mere aesthetic purposes, having no reference to the
safety, health, morals or general welfare of the community at
large, the state may not under its police power regulate or con-
trol the use by the owner of private property." 53 Yeager v.
Traylor5 4 is unique; there a Pennsylvania court permitted an
apartment-hotel in a residential district to erect a parking-garage
for its permanent tenants on the condition that:
"The proposed building . . . must be enclosed entirely and
conform in architectural design to the building to which it is at-
tached. Ramps and other devices having a tendency to disturb the
peace and quiet of the neighborhood must be avoided, and all
means for raising and lowering cars must be within the walls of the
building. If it is proposed to supply parking space upon the roof,
an effective screen must be provided by means of a suitable balus-
trade or other device to hide the unsightly appearance which would
be the result of such practice. No repairs of any character accom-
panied by noise should be carried on, and the sale of gasoline and
oil should be limited strictly to tenants occupying the apartments
and having cars stored in the garage."'
Thus, where the nature of a residential area was in issue, the
court seemed to feel that its duty was to maintain architectural
uniformity and purity as well as quiet and absence from noxious
odors. It may be asked whether such a doctrine would not
restrict adventures in modernistic design.56
borhood in a city is for the comfort and happiness of the residents,
and it sustains in a general way the value of property in the neigh-
borhood."
'Typical of cases sustaining by dictum regulation on purely
aesthetic grounds are: Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 53, 214
Pac. 99 (1923); dissenting opinion, State ex rel Twin City B. & I. Co.
v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 12-13, 174 N.W. 885, 888 (1919); dissenting
opinion in Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 599, 194 N.W. 159, 164
(1923).
"Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 463-64, 84 S.E. 105,
108 (1915).
"306 Pa. 530, 160 Atl. 108 (1932). Although this is a nuisance
case, I see no reason why it should not be included under a dis-
cussion of zoning legislation. The remedy of a court, particularly in
the instant case, in a nuisance action is, in effect, zoning; for it
reinforces or denies reinforcement to the general character of the
neighborhood. Thus, a study of the nuisance cases (garages, fac-
tories, undertaking establishments, etc.) might help to show the
aesthetic preconceptions of the judges. Unfortunately, the most
pertinent fact-whether or not the judge knew from personal
experience the neighborhood in question-would ordinarily be lack-
ing.
"Id. at 535,'160 Atl. 109 (1932).
"State ex rel Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 159, 196 N.W.
451, 455 (1923): "The rights of property should not be sacrificed to
the pleasure of an ultra-aesthetic taste." Cf. Noel, Unaesthetic
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No extended discussion is needed to show that in problems
of copyright infringement, for example, similar aesthetic judg-
ments are to be found. A court is often obliged to determine
the exact scope of the original creation, and to do so it must
decide what elements of the work in question make it original
and unique. Indeed, in all questions of copyright,5 7 from public
policy-s to copyrightability, aesthetic taste is constantly shown.
F0elhr v. Ber is55 :s an instance; the court held that a series of
dance tableaux were not copyrightable, since the statute required
"a dramatic composition"
"It is essential to such a composition that it should tell some
story. The plot may be simple. It may be but the narrative or
representation of a single transaction, but it must repeat or mimic
some action, speech, emotion, passion, or character, real or imaginary.
. . . the end sought for and accomplished was solely the devising of
a series of graceful movements, combined with an attractive arrange-
ment of drapery, lights, and shadows, telling no story, portraying no
character, depicting no emotion. . . . Such an idea may be pleas-
ing, but it can hardly be called dramatic.'"
Would the same court decide that the painters of non-objective
art are entitled to no protection.?
Similar aesthetic considerations are to be found in trade-
Sights as Nuisances (1939) 25 CAN. L.Q. 1, 11: "A structure of
harmless character, such as a style of architecture known to be dis-
tasteful to a neighbor, and complained of on the ground that it was
erected for purposes of annoyance, could hardly be enjoined." And
at least one court has distinguished between utility and beauty, a
distinction contrary to the theory of modern functionalistic archi-
tecture. Meighon v. Birmingham Terminal Co., 165 Ala. 591, 600,
51 So. 775, 778: ". . . convenience is a matter of utility, while the
aesthetic relates to the beautiful in its adaption to the production
of pleasureable sensation."
"
7For problems of copyright and related questions, see, for
example, AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1936); LADAS, INTER-
NATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY (1938);
MARCHETTI, LAW OF THE STAGE, SCREEN AND RADIO (1936); WITTEN-
BERG, THE PROTECTION AND MARKETING OF LITERARY PROPERTY (1937).
t" See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark and Sons, 318 U. S.
643, 657 (1943): "We cannot draw a principle of law from the fami-
liar stories of garret-poverty of some men of literary genius.
• . . We do not have such assured knowledge about authorship
and particularly about song writing, or the psychology of gifted
writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in importing into
Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom to
dispose of their property possessed by others."
" 50 Fed. 926 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892); Cf. Glazer v. Hoffman, 16
So. (2d) 53 (Fla. 1943) where the case is cited with approval. See
Young, Copyright Law (1940) 28 KY. L. J. 447; Comment (1940) 49
YALE L. J. 559, n. 4; Note (1941) 20 ORE. L. REV. 372.
" 50 Fed. 926, 929 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892).
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mark 6' and patent lav,0 2 but the discussion need not be ex-
tended: the type of case has been indicated.
We come now to the fourth source, the nature of law, that
is to say, the general system of law as aesthetic. The aesthetic
approach, it should be realized, is in no sense exclusive. It does
not deny (indeed, it ordinarily affirms) historical6 3 and psycho-
logical G4 interpretation. It differs only in approach, being a
horizontal rather than a vertical standard, horizontal in that it
believes that a similarity in cultural products can be seen from
those products themselves. 65
Nor is terming law poetry66 or art a completely novel idea.
John C. H. Wu, in his essay, The Art of Law, 67 was explicit:
"I am not speaking metaphorically or being rhetorical when I
compare law with the other arts. I perceive real identities between
law on the one hand and music, poetry and painting on the other.
All works of art are the results of selection, a process which 'natural-
ly involves the acceptance of some elements and the rejection of
others.' They are all products of thoughtful and heartful selection
I See, for example, Derenberg, Trade-Marks Ante Portas (1943)
52 YALE L. J. 829.
' See Wolff, Copyright Law and Patent Law: A Comparison
(1942) 27 IowA L. REV. 250. See especially the dispute as to the
doctrine of "flash of genius" in patent law in various articles in
volumes 24 and 25 of the J. Pat. Off. Soc. Cf. Potts, Invention and
Graduated Validity (1942) 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 629 for an interest-
ing suggestion; also Frank, Thoughts on Patents (1942) 24 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC. 808, 809, n. 1.
I SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTY (1896) 5: "The second
method consists in the historical explanation of conduct or of art as
a part of anthropology, and seeks to discover the conditions of vari-
ous types of character, forms of polity, conceptions of justice, and
schools of criticism and of art." Cf. Kuhn, The Function of the Com-
parative Method in Legal History and Philosophy (1939) 13 TUL. L.
REV. 350.
64Id. at 5-6. "The third method in ethics and aesthetics is psy-
chological, as the other two are respectively didactic and historical.
It deals with moral and aesthetic judgments as phenomena of mind
and products of mental evolution. . . . Such an inquiry, if pursued
successfully, would yield an understanding of the reason why we
think anything right or beautiful, wrong or ugly."
" See Ayres, Book Review (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 881, 882: "What
do lawyers mean by 'juristic beauty'? Evidently something quite
distinct from the mores content of the law, something which can be
perceived, judged and approved without reference to the mores-
norm of the people whose law it is."
SPENDER, LIFE AND THE POET (London, 1942) 31: "The amazing
influence of the Old Testament may be partly due to the fact that the
Jewish law is not only a great social institution but also that it pro-
vides a poetic description of life. The Jewish law is poetry. Again,
the Sermon on the Mount is both a series of admonitions on be-
havior and also poetry."01In THE ART OF LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS JURIDIcIAL AND LITERARY
(Shanghai, 1936).
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and arrangement of the telling elements. These telling ele-
ments, which in music are sounds, in poetry words, and in painting
colors, happen in the art of law to be interests. There is only a
difference in the media and the materials; the essential thing in all
arts remains the same, namely, an orderly, symmetrical, and har-
monic arrangement and organization of the telling element."'
Unfortunately, however, when Wu attempted to illustrate this
theory of law as art, it appeared that "art" in law was to him
no more than the typical Poundian view of the law as a recon-
ciliation of social interests.69 Terming this process "art" added
nothing.
More satisfactory by far has been Professor Llewellyn's
attempt to evolve a theory of jurisprudence founded on the
aesthetic approach.70 He recognized that it was essential to
such an approach to divide law into "style-periods. '" 7 1 Yet
several objections are to be made. In the first place, although
realizing the similarity of law to other arts,7 2 Llewellyn does
not attempt to correlate legal "style-periods" with other con-
temporaneous cultural "style-periods." Thus, he deals only
with American law and divides our law into three periods:
formative, maturity, and the new period characterized by a con-
scious concern about policy. He does not suggest that, for ex-
ample, the same periods would be applicable to American
architecture. That is to say, he does not at all accept the thesis
that law as a cultural product may have the same characteristics
as other cultural manifestations, typically art and literature.
Secondly, Llewellyn speaks of "art" as if it meant only "good
art." He speaks of beauty as though it were an isolated phen-
omenon." 3 And thirdly, he differentiates between method and
Id. at 3.
Wu, Proportionately between Means and Ends: A Study in the
Art of Law in THE ART OF LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS JURIDICIAL AND
LITERARY (Shanghai, 1936).
" Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (1942)
9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, esp. 227-250.
Id. at 230-32.
' Id. at 230: "The esthetic phase of a legal system is cognate to
architecture as it is not, for instance, to painting, and as it rather
rarely is to music. Architecture and engineering strike most closely
home-perhaps because both look so directly and so inescapably to
use."
"Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales (1939) 52 HARV.
L. REV. 873, 876: "And the work of the artist, accomplished with poor
intellectual equipment, is not clearly intelligible to the inept readers.
. . . Thus one beautiful opinion, or six beautiful opinions, still
give no guaranty of further decision being in accordance with them
unless they are kept from being mixed in with quantities of poor
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content7T4 a distinction that no critic of painting or of the
novel would lightly undertake in describing the "style" of a
period. Subject-matter and craft, content and form, are inex-
tricably bound together, and it is surprising to find a "realist"
differentiating between them even for the limited purposes of
his article. And even more surprising are Lewellyn's limited
aesthetic ideals for the law. After stating that "the prime
test ... of legal beauty remains the functional test" 75 and that
"Legal aesthetics are in essence functional aesthetics ' ' he
makes important qualifications:
"With the idea of functional evaluation I have no desire to take
over into legal esthetics the exaggerations and to my mind absurdi-
ties of those extreme 'functionalists' in architecture and related arts
who hold no form, no piece, no ornament to be esthetically legiti-
mate which is not, with maximum economy and efficiency, a working
portion of the thing designed."'
It is a paradox that Llewellyn, long the law's avant-garde,78
looks with disfavor on the theories of the avant-garde of archi-
tecture,7 9 although architecture is his own prime example of
an art related to the law.
From these criticisms of Llewellyn can be derived the final
necessary requisites of methodology before the system law itself
can be usefully employed as a source of legal aesthetic theory.
An investigation should be made to determine whether the
periods of style in law correspond to the style periods in the
arts.80 It is at least likely, working on the premise that law is
opinions which misanalyze and manhandle the same type of situa-
tion. Thus, in 1870 to 1900, a period which I see as one of great con-
fusion in American Sales law, there are to be found judgments which
in result, reasoning, concept, and explanation are very lovely. Nor
are such judgments really rare. What they are, is noncharacteristic.
They do not control their brethren in the judicial democracy." See
also Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback (1929) 52 HARV. L. REV.
725, 739.
'7 Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (1942)
9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 235.
'Id. at 229.
Ibid.
Id. at 248.
7' Cf. id. at 235: "One meets, in law, too, the impatient, relentless,
clamor for modernity-whether need or fad."
" See WRIGHT, Aw ORGANIc ARCITECTURE (London, 1939) 15: "I
am speaking of this new movement . . . as the ideal of a life
organic, of buildings as organic, of an economic system truly organic.
A statesman would be a great architect in this sense of knowing life
at its best to be organic.
I See LIFSCHITz,'THE PHMOSOPHY OF ART OF KARL MARX (1938).
The Marxists emphasize the interdependence of political concepts
and aesthetic beliefs. Thus, romanticism is termed "a politico-
aesthetic doctrine." Id. at 31.
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a typical product of the culture, that we have in the law
classicism, romanticism,," Gothicism, impressionism, eclecticism,
and perhaps even the beginnings of such modern movements as
expressionism 2 and certainly functionalism.8 3 This is not to
say that any absolute correlation will be found. Law, founded
on precedent, may show a time-lag; courts are not museums of
modern art. In any case, for the purposes of such an investi-
gation, account must be taken not only of the techniques of law
but of the content of legal doctrine, judicial and legislative, and
of the hierarchy of legal doctrines. If some continuing con-
nection between artistic and legal style-periods is found, law
can once again be looked upon as a community endeavor and
its function in the community existence more fully compre-
hended.8 4 It will aid us in distinguishing between dead law
and living law, law that belongs in the rare book rooms of
libraries and law which is to be encouraged-to be written,
read and learned.
"Llewellyn, The Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (1942)
9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 231: "One meets also in law the romantic trend,
the urge to cure the immediate past by recourse to the 'good' past,
more remote."
'2The attempts of the legal realists to approach law from many
different directions-psychological attitudes of the judge, regroupings
of cases, courses which cut across traditional law-school curriculum
-might be compared with the efforts of modern artists to find a new
vitality in their medium by a reexamination of spatial and lineal
relationships. And the realists' objective examinations of what they
consider the result, among other things, of the subjectivism of judges,
is, in some ways, similar in intent to expressionistic art.
I Although Llewellyn rejects thoroughly functional law, the city
planners and functional architects insist that the social and legal
structure of the community be reorganized ("reintegrated") in ac-
cordance with their beliefs. See MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVLIZA-
TION (1934); MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES (1938).
' Cf. Konvitz, Book Review (1943) 43 COL. L. REV. 1089.
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